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POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE POLITICS OF THE PAST: 
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED TYPOLOGY OF POWER IN PRE-
AND EARLY-MODERN SOUTHEAST ASIA
  
This article explores methodological approaches to the study of pre 
and early modern state systems in southeast Asia, the study of which 
has remained, almost exclusively, the preserve of anthropologists, 
ethnographers, archaeologists and historians. Notwithstanding the 
regularity with which southeast Asian history and anthropology 
have been informed by political science methodologies, with a few 
very notable exceptions, political scientists, themselves, have rarely 
sought to extend their discipline into the pre- and early-modern eras. 
Recognising that neither states, power nor politics began in the 
1950s, this study aims to redress that situation by seeking, overtly, to 
integrate a range of political science methodologies into the existing 
anthropological and historical literature on power and statehood in 
pre- and early-modern southeast Asia. In doing so it aims also to 
establish the utility of political science methodologies to the analysis 
of the remoter past in southeast Asia (and, by implication, to other 
areas of the world).
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This article explores methodological approaches to the study of pre- and early-
modern state systems in southeast Asia, the study of which has remained, almost 
exclusively, the preserve of anthropologists, ethnographers, archaeologists and 
historians. Notwithstanding the regularity with which southeast Asian history 
and anthropology have been informed by political science methodologies,1 
with a few very notable exceptions, political scientists, themselves, have rarely 
sought to extend their discipline into the pre- and early-modern eras.2 
Recognising that neither states, power nor politics began in the 1950s, 
this study aims to redress that situation by seeking, overtly, to integrate a 
range of political science methodologies into the existing anthropological and 
historical literature on power and statehood in pre- and early-modern southeast 
Asia. In doing so it aims also to establish the utility of political science 
methodologies to the analysis of the remoter past in southeast Asia (and, by 
implication, to other areas of the world) both to political scientists, for most of 
whom that past is the preserve of other disciplines and to historians, for most 
of whom such methodologies have utility only in more contemporary studies. 
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The article, first, delineates the three broad methodologies found in existing 
literature about power and statehood, before identifying a number of their 
shortcomings and proposing a more integrated, interdisciplinary, typology for 
the analysis of pre- and early-modern Southeast Asia.
One major objection to this project derives from the idea that 
‘politics’ are not a universal form of human activity. Deriving from the 
scholarship of Hans Baron, the proponents of this view argue that ‘politics’ 
requires a self-conscious participation in a public sphere, conceived of as such. 
Baron identified in Italy during the late 14th Century, the emergence of “a new 
philosophy of political engagement and active life, developed in opposition 
ideas of scholarly withdrawal”.3 Such ‘Civic Humanism’ created the necessary 
public space for self-conscious participation, a space occupied, according to 
Pocock, by “intersecting persons rather than of universal norms and traditional 
institutions”.4 
These ideas have been applied with insight to colonial Malaya by 
Anthony Milner, who drew on Baron and Pocock, as well as Habermas, 
in seeking to delineate the “invention of politics in colonial Malaya”.5 
Although Milner claimed to have discovered “the invention of politics in the 
intertextuality of Malay ideological dispute”,6 as I have suggested elsewhere, 
the new loyalties that he uncovered, along with the new modes of political 
action, described as they were in a new political vocabulary, were evidence 
of the transmutation and reconception of politics, rather than of its invention.7 
However profound the changes in identity, political action and vocabulary 
that Milner has delineated, they did not erase earlier struggles over material 
resources, loyalties and authority which have been (and remain) enduring 
elements in the drama of power in Malay, and other, southeast Asian state 
systems.8  Furthermore, even if accepted, Milner’s analysis, or those of the 
scholars on whose insights he built, would not relieve political science of the 
challenge of exploring the remoter past but, rather, would provide for it a more 
complex and theoretically challenging subject with which to engage.
Area Studies scholars have developed three broad conceptual 
frameworks for the study of non-western politics. These frameworks, which 
relate, in fact, to three types of power and three sorts of evidence, are economic 
structuralism, structural functionalism and culturalism.  It is a central tenet 
of this study that each of these methodologies on its own is inadequate for 
understanding a political system.  
Economic Structuralism
Michael Mann noted that economic power “derives from the satisfaction 
of subsistence needs through the social organisation of the extraction, 
transformation, distribution and consumption of the objects of nature”.9 It is 
possible to analyse politics in terms of the organisation of resources, and to 
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account for change, or its absence, by locating inconsistencies, changes or 
contradictions in the economic structure and its dependent social structure.10 
Writing about southeast Asia, Victor Lieberman expressed the assumptions of 
economic structuralists clearly:
How did economic expansion influence political and cultural life? In the 
short term, by creating land and monetary shortages and by aggravating center-
periphery and intra-elite conflicts, economic growth repeatedly destabilized 
mainland polities. In one realm after another, breakdowns during the 14th, 16th 
and 18th centuries followed periods of rapid demographic and/or commercial 
growth not easily accommodated by existing political arrangements.11
 Such essentially utilitarian analysis, deriving from Thomas Hobbes, 
has a long tradition in English and U. S. American scholarship. Marxism is its 
most important modern variant.12   
Economic structuralists do not concentrate on social or cultural particularities. 
Thus Norman Owen, in studying nineteenth century “peasants in a colonial 
society moving from subsistence to commercialisation”, considered that “a 
deeper knowledge of their culture, however valuable it might be in interpreting 
the precise forms taken by their thoughts and actions, is not really necessary 
to explain the major facts of the social and economic history”.13 J. H. Kautsky 
would agree.  On the basis that people behave according to economic or social 
interests, he asserted the validity of generalisations which are broad enough to 
encompass French knights and Tutsi warriors.14 Through economic and social 
structure, he would compare polities widely separated by time and space.  Such 
a methodology not only facilitates comparison and encourages the identification 
of similarities, it also obscures real differences.  As Michael Mann observed, 
to “concentrate, as Kautsky does, upon the similarities of regimes such as the 
Inca Empire and the Kingdom of Spain (both ‘aristocratic empires’) is to forget 
what happened when 180 Spaniards entered an Inca Empire of millions.”15
Structural Functionalism
As methodologies which had been developed to analyse liberal democracies, 
and which focused on the separation of powers and election patterns, proved 
inadequate for analysing the politics of the newly independent states of 
Africa and Asia, David  Apter and others discovered that the work of Evans-
Pritchard and other anthropologists “seemed to have more important things 
to say about politics than most political scientists”.16 These political analysts 
adopted and adapted structuralism from anthropological theory because it 
provided a methodology for comparing different societies.  Rather than focus 
on the structure of an economy and society, structural functionalists study the 
structure of politics, within a society and, having identified the elements of the 
structure, allocate political functions to them.  By locating the performance 
of universal functions within the structure of the political systems, political 
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scientists hoped to develop a more dynamic framework than the relatively 
static structuralism.17 
Structural functionalists define the functions of a political system 
primarily in terms of the maintenance of the system itself.  They see most 
parts of the system as performing functions which enable the system to 
survive. Those functions that are necessary for the maintenance of the system 
are political socialisation and recruitment, interest articulation, interest 
aggregation and political communication on the one hand, and rule-making, 
rule-application and adjudication on the other18  Structural functionalists define 
the political system itself so as to exclude the economy, culture and social 
structure, which, though they contain sources both of conflict and of power, are 
seen as constituting the environment of the political system.19 
 But politics is not just about the maintenance of systems.  It is, as the 
structural functionalists themselves concede, about “the drama of power”.20 
By excluding from the political system sources of power and of conflict, 
structural functionalism de-emphasises conflict and the sources of conflict, and 
the pursuit and use of power.  In focusing on the functions necessary for the 
survival of the system, structural functionalism emphasises implicit functions 
in a political system at the expense of the explicit functions.  Whether or not 
we agree with Engels that the state is “a machine for the oppression of one 
class by another”,21 one of the primary functions of pre- and early-modern 
states was extractive and their history is, explicitly, a history of domination 
of peoples and struggles over resources.  In pre- and early-modern southeast 
Asia, as elsewhere, the state provided a structure to mobilise resources for the 
maintenance of the ruler and his court.  
 Structural functionalism does not focus attention on these central 
issues, and thus is vulnerable to criticism for its conservative bias.  Although 
Sullivan goes too far in claiming that structural functionalism “celebrates the 
given social order, however that order may adversely affect certain groups”,22 
as a methodology, it helps to sanitise politics by not focusing centrally on 
power and conflict. 
Culturalism
Structural functionalists initiated a closer examination of the role of political 
culture in political development.  Because of their preoccupation with the 
structure of political systems, however, many structural functionalists failed 
to perceive the central importance of political culture in engendering political 
activity and, indeed, in defining the role of specific institutions.23  
 Culturalists perceive that cultures provide value systems which 
motivate individuals, shaping political perspectives and actions.  Such scholars 
try to establish “not only ... the function of a particular institution ... on the 
level of performance, but also on the level of meaning”.24  This change in 
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focus engenders consideration of different bodies of evidence from those 
considered within other methodologies, resulting in different assessments of 
the ‘functions’ of institutions, forcing us to recognise, even, that the concept of 
‘function’, itself, is culturally conditioned.25
 Culturalists, however, often fail to explore the economic relationships 
which both underpin political systems and provide the frameworks within which 
cultural perceptions are developed.  Shelly Errington dismissed attempts to do 
so.  She noted that “humans make real through practice what they think is real, 
their ideas about these things are not superstition or false consciousness but 
what becomes socially real”.26  Errington seemed even to deny the relevance of 
economics. She ignored:
what could be called the mechanics of economic power: land tenure 
and rents, and the devices by which the rich maintained themselves as 
such.  I have concentrated instead on the poetics of power.27
 The failure of Errington and other culturalists to integrate imagined 
realities with material ones is a central problem in culturalism.  The importance 
of culturally based perceptions and realities does not diminish the need 
for humans to sustain themselves or the role of systems of social power in 
regulating the levels of that sustenance, a point Errington has recognised 
elsewhere.28 Anomalies between material and imagined sources of power need 
to be resolved, and culturalism is at its most vulnerable in its failure to provide 
a framework for establishing relative hierarchies and importance. 
 Towards An Inter-Methodological Approach
The study of southeast Asian history and politics does not need additional 
methodologies.  Economic structuralism aids our understanding, for example, 
of the material basis of elite power in Perak and how it was exploited;29 
structural functionalism helps us analyse the organisation of traditional Malay 
polities;30and culturalism is an essential tool for understanding how Malays 
conceived and described politics.31 To comprehend a political system, we need 
to draw on all three perspectives.  “In the real world”, as Dennis Kavanagh 
remarked,
political activity connects with history, law, culture, society, and so 
on.  It is necessary to take these phenomena into account in any 
explanation of politics and to use other approaches, where they can 
be helpful.32
 When Weber sought to ‘decompose’ political sociology into material 
interest, authority structures and value orientation it was to aid analysis of all 
Jebat  Volume 43 (2) (December 2016) Page | 78
Article: J.H Walker
three rather than to deny their essential interdependence.33 
 I am not arguing that distinct methodologies should be collapsed 
into one, even if that were possible.  One of the most important functions of 
methodologies is to direct the researcher to evidence which might otherwise 
be ignored.34  Patrick Sullivan, in also noting this, outlined the ‘dialectical 
relationship’ between conceptual frameworks and empirical research:
 
The perception, selection and ordering of data requires, on the one 
hand an epistemology, an assumption of how the object can be 
known, and on the other hand implies a theory of the relationship of 
objects of knowledge.  Natural facts, whether historical or otherwise, 
do not surrender up their meaning in the moment of perception35
 The process of comprehending the meaning of ‘natural facts’ is 
essential to both the methodology used and the process of structuring facts 
into sequences embodying causes and effects.36 That different methodologies 
bring to our attention different sorts of evidence does not allow us to ignore 
that evidence which does not fit our methodology. We should be prepared 
to combine methodologies so as to encompass the complexity of apparently 
conflicting material rather than to seek to reduce the evidence to conformity 
with a single framework.  
 It is not sufficient that, as Oran Young observed, different 
conceptual frameworks “tend to interact with each other over time”.37 They 
are individually incomplete and need to be in constant interaction.  Michael 
Mann’s identification of four sources of power economic, political, military 
and ideological  provides a useful framework for interrelating and elaborating 
these methodologies.38
The Economic Bases of Power
Economic power derives from the universal need of humans to sustain 
themselves materially, that is, to secure food, clothing and shelter, and from 
the consequent potential (which these needs underpin) to monopolise control 
of the organisation of “the extraction, transformation, distribution, and 
consumption of the objects of nature”.39 Control of economic sources of power 
gives rise to other sources and forms of power because human dependence 
on the objects of nature is absolute: “the constraints of economics are prior to 
the constraints of morality and law”.40 Control of the economic system which 
sustains a community precedes the formation of states. Further, control of “the 
resources necessary for the maintenance of the polity” ensures dominance 
within the polity.41
 The resources necessary for maintenance of the state can be derived 
from control of production or control of distribution or exchange.  Resources 
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derived from control of distribution or exchange are vulnerable to changes in 
distribution routes and socio-economic configurations far from the influence 
of the dependent elites.42  Such resources might have the advantage, however, 
of reducing the need for elites to extract goods and services from their own 
populations, thereby facilitating the development of perceived group interests 
and shared cultures.
The Political Bases of Power
The desire of elite groups to extract from subject groups goods and services 
gives rise to parallel political structures which themselves then become a 
source of unequal political power within the community involved.
Patron-Client Relations
As a concomitant of the development of unequal control over the production 
and distribution of goods and services, vertical relations of dependency 
develop.  These are primary political relationships.  James Scott elaborated 
their operations from the work of anthropologists, defining them as:
a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely 
instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-
economic status (patron) uses his own influences and resources to 
provide protection and/or benefits for a person of lower status (client) 
who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and 
assistance, including personal services to the patron.43
 Scott argued that, although the relationship between patron and client 
was unequal, clients had sufficient resources under their control for a degree 
of reciprocity to exist.  Therefore, client-patron relations are not characterised 
by command.  Inequality is essential to the relationship, however, since 
the patron seeks to bind the client by “a debt of obligation”.44 The client’s 
inability to repay the debt results in the development over time of “a cluster 
of asymmetrical obligations”,45 which diminish the client’s capacity to form 
new relationships with other patrons or to ‘square the debt’ and terminate the 
relationship.  It is possible, even, that this dependence becomes underpinned 
by emotional bonds which strengthen other links between client and patron as 
“repetition and familiarity” between the two develop, over time, into “interest 
and affection”.46 These clusters of political relationships are functional, in that 
they operate to the (unequal) benefit of both parties, both of whom therefore 
develop an interest in maintaining the relationship.  Although clients can 
assert their own interests within the relationship by using the weapons of 
peasant resistance, “footdragging, dissimulation, false-compliance, pilfering, 
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feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage”,47 such forms of resistance 
operate to maintain patron-client networks.  They allow the clients to protest 
incrementally, applying pressure on patrons to modify their demands or to 
increase the benefits they provide for clients.  These forms of resistance do not 
challenge the economic and power inequalities that underpin the patron-client 
relationship in the way in which class struggle would, however.  The classic 
constraint on southeast Asian governments was not the threat of revolt, but the 
threat of “flight and evasion of taxes” by peasants and commoners.48 
 The disincentives for resistance and joint actions by clients against 
the impositions of patrons should not be overstated, however:
Notwithstanding the ideological constructs which underpin and 
legitimise clientage, resistance is endemic in patron-client systems. 
Although such systems institutionalise the patron’s power, they also 
institutionalise the value of the client to the patron. In addition to the 
dyadic conflict which this implies, patron-client systems provide a 
structure within which numbers of clients can jointly resist the 
exactions of their patrons in an attempt to maximise their economic 
and political autonomy.49
As I have observed elsewhere, for clients to engage in joint resistance 
against patrons requires their already having formed bonds among themselves 
stronger than the pressure to compete with one and other for the patron’s 
attention and favour. In spite of:
the capacity for patron-client ties to cross ethnic, religious, linguistic 
and cultural boundaries, the extractive force of the relationship will 
be diminished when it transcends boundaries of social identity and 
loyalty. In fragmented and fissiparous societies, in which 
communications are primitive and difficult, and political and social 
identities local, these bonds are likely so be at village level.50
Entourages and Circles
The economic inequality which underpins the development of patron-client 
relations encourages the creation of multiple relations by the patron, who will 
develop as many relationships as are needed or can be sustained.  Thus clusters 
of dependent relationships develop around a patron, giving rise to what Lucien 
has termed the “entourage”.51Patron-client relations facilitate, moreover, the 
development of complex, layered structures since patrons can also be the 
clients of even more powerful figures and clients the patrons of less powerful 
people.  This network, of patrons and their clients and the clients’ own clients, 
Hanks termed the “circle”.52 These linkages are not only resilient, they are 
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expansive, associating large populations over wide areas into an interlocking 
political hierarchy.  Errington suggested that: 
a large polity could be constructed, arranged in a pattern of 
entourages whose size, power, and control of human and material 
resources ... decline with increasing distance from the ruler at the 
centre of it all.  Each smaller entourage would be similar in principle 
and in organisation to the larger entourage encompassing it ..53.
 Systems of patron-client relations were not only endemic to pre- and 
early-modern southeast Asia, they characterise much of its contemporary 
politics. 
 The development of patron-client links is a primary political process 
underpinning the development of structures of social and territorial control, 
such as chieftaincy, aristocracy and sovereignty, and is central to both 
conquest and indigenous theories of the origins of states.54 It also underpins 
the development of cleavages within the elites as patrons compete with each 
other to attract clients, giving rise to factional politics.55  Each member of an 
entourage is focused on his or her own relationship with the patron rather than 
on relationships with other members of the entourage.  This not only precludes 
the development of class identity, it promotes indifference and hostility, 
particularly among higher ranking clients, as they jostle for the patron’s favour 
or resources.56 Thus the “most enduring and solid relations are between leaders 
and followers rather than among followers”.57 Patrons also compete for clients, 
whose interests they represent to higher ranking patrons.  Patrons need clients 
in order to maximise their own status within the hierarchy of the ‘circle’. 
Kautsky is mistaken, therefore, in arguing that “aristocratic politics takes place 
within aristocratic society alone and not within the total and overwhelmingly 
non-aristocratic populations of the aristocratic empire”.58 The role of individual 
clients is not equal to the role of individual patrons, and the processes linking 
them into the structure of political conflict may not be obvious, yet the roles of 
both, and the processes, are pervasive. 
Rulers, Chiefs and Officials: Aristocracy and Bureaucracy
The ways that patron-client linkages are organised and described can express 
different ways of organising power, and can create various sorts of power.  I 
have already noted that, as patrons develop their resources base and can sponsor 
the development of more patron-client networks, they create entourages and 
circles of supporters.  At any stage in the relationship between patron and 
clients, the clients must choose whether their interests are better served by 
attending primarily to their duties as clients rather than by developing their 
potential as patrons; that is, whether they should seek to expand their client 
Jebat  Volume 43 (2) (December 2016) Page | 82
Article: J.H Walker
base and maximise their independence, or whether they should seek to increase 
the power of their patrons, in whose glory and success they share.  Thus, as 
Machiavelli noted, the kingdoms known to history have been governed in two 
ways: 
 either by a prince and his servants, who, as ministers by his grace and 
 permission, assist in governing the realm; or by a prince and by 
 barons, who hold their position not by favour of the ruler but by 
 antiquity of blood.59
The distinction relates less to the antiquity of blood than to whether the notables 
“were directly appointed by and primarily beholden to the ruler”, or whether 
they “owed their position to their own primacy within some sub-group within 
the rulership”.60  
 The two types of position embody different relationships between the 
ruler and chief or official, and between the chief or official and the subject 
people.  Rulers depend for power on the support of chiefs and the chiefs’ 
capacity to mobilise their subject peoples in the ruler’s support. Officials derive 
their authority from the ruler, who mobilises the support of his population and 
is able to absorb any independent sources of power he may confront.  Although 
Kautsky argued that “officials in bureaucratic empires served the same function 
as aristocrats in all aristocratic empires”, governing to enrich themselves,61 
the distinction between chiefs and officials is important.  It defines a process 
in political development where the ruler’s authority and power expands and 
contracts, and where the balance of power in a political system moves from 
the centre to the periphery or vice versa.  It can also be a source of political 
tension in a polity.62Errington found that, in Sulawesi, the need of elite figures 
to balance their access to both types of power created tension.  In Sulawesi, 
nobles could afford to be neither “cut off from the highest prestige center by 
the lack of connections in the court ... nor cut off from influence, wealth, and 
power by lack of regional followers and loyal henchmen”.63
 O. W. Wolters explored the formation of entourages and circles in 
southeast Asian state formation.  He described how “men of prowess” attracted 
followers, including other, lesser men of prowess64 who saw that association 
with the primary patron would facilitate their greater access to power than 
would their independence.  The greater the number of magnates a ruler could 
attract, the greater the resources and power available for use in attracting 
more clients.  Moreover, the greater the number of followers, the greater the 
personal esteem a follower gained by a ranking among them.  Potential small 
rulers would gain prestige by achieving a high ranking position within a more 
powerful ruler’s entourage.  They might prefer “being a great lord to being a 
petty king”.65  As Wolters observed of seventh century Cambodia, “what we 
would define as ‘the kingdom’ was no more than the territorial measurement of 
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a particular lord’s prowess”.66  
 Thus Malay datus in the Indonesian archipelago sought dependent 
positions at the court of the Maharaja of Srivijaya,67 and centuries later the 
same process was discernible when the rulers of Palembang and Bentan were 
described as following the progenitor of the Malacca sultans to Singapore.68 At 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, Sultan Ahmaddin of Perak sought to 
evade the political demands of his Bugis rivals by recognising Sultan Mahmud 
of Riau-Lingga as his overlord.69  Even the tributary relations between many of 
the states of pre- and early-modern southeast Asia and China were “solicited by 
the donors rather than imposed”.70  The process underpinning these transactions 
is that the ruler absorbs the power of the follower, who then derives status and 
power from his association with the empowered ruler.71 Wolters described the 
resulting networks of relationships in southeast Asia as “mandalas”.72  The 
importance of such retinue-forming to political processes in the Malay world 
is confirmed by the development of sumptuary laws which prohibited lesser 
figures from mobilising followings comparable to those of their rulers.73  
 Because political relationships change, and foci of power and loyalty 
shift, individual members of a ruler’s entourage can seek to establish their 
own primacy within the authority the ruler.  Or they can respond to the ruler’s 
diminishing power by developing their own separate authority as independent 
rulers.  The very flexibility which makes entourages and circles so important 
in political development keeps the power balances within them fluid, often 
precluding the entrenchment of particular relationships.  D. A. Low noted 
of 17th Century India the “striking” frequency with which officials tended 
to establish chiefly (and, eventually, sovereign) power.74  Similarly, during 
the late 18th Century, the great court officials of the Riau-Lingga sultanate 
secured regional power bases which they were then able to develop into 
independent sultanates.75 Moreover, these fissiparous tendencies can actually 
be encouraged by the ruler’s success in expanding the theatre of his power, 
each success increasing the technical difficulties of government.  Within a 
century of Charlemagne’s death “his centralised empire became the heartland 
of decentralised western European feudalism”.76 
 Centralising and de-centralising pressures are likely to co-exist in any 
political system at any time.  The challenge for most rulers has always been to 
maintain sufficient control of the resources of the state to increase or maintain 
their primacy.  However the processes that led to the accretion or dismantling 
of political relationships were perceived in various cultures, such changes 
were the outcome of competition over the mobilisation and deployment of 
resources.  The flow of power and authority between centralising rulers and 
their entourages on the one hand, and chiefs and feudal nobles on the other, 
has provided communities and individuals with opportunities to achieve 
political change.  Through decentralisation of power, local communities 
had opportunities to establish new structures or change old ones. Through 
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centralisation, they acquired opportunities to form political relationships which 
could contain the power of local lords.  Therefore Weber’s distinction between 
patrimonialism and feudalism is not just one of “ideal types used for analytical 
purposes” as Kautsky claimed,77 but representative of historical reality and 
political choice.
 The development of institutions which embody political and economic 
relationships creates new sources of power in a society.78 To create power, 
institutions need both to integrate the support of people and to meet their 
demands.  Not all institutions are effective in this.  In Samuel Huntington’s 
terms, an organisation’s inability to provide a framework for balancing support 
from people with their demands, and the consequent alienation of a population 
from its political institutions, causes a “motivation-organisation vacuum”.79 
The Military Bases of Power
Military power is a third form of organisational power which “derives from the 
necessity of organised physical defence and its usefulness for aggression”.80 
It is closely allied with political power, of which it is a particular type.81 
Military power is distinguished, however, by the element of terror which is 
essential to its operations.  Military organisation and activity can contribute 
to the development of power only by producing or threatening terror.  Walter 
distinguished the ‘victim’ from the ‘target’ of terror.  “The victim perishes, 
but the target reacts to the spectacle or the news of that destruction with some 
manner of submission or accommodation”.82 
 Terror can be used by political elites to overcome threats from outside 
as well as from subject groups already located within the polity.83  Although 
military power can force the submission of people, it has limited utility in 
establishing control over a population without support from other sorts of 
power.  Reliance just on military power to control a population would succumb 
to Huntington’s ‘organisation-motivation vacuum’.  Nonetheless, military 
power should be identified separately from political power, first, because of the 
intensity of the violence it deploys, secondly, because of its utility as a means 
of both mobilising a community under its leadership and, thirdly, because of its 
capacity to provide beneficial returns to populations that deploy it successfully. 
Through the application of military power rulers can mobilise to protect the 
economic basis of the polity, and to expand it.  When used successfully military 
power provides patrons with increased resources to disburse to clients. The use 
of force is, as Clausewitz argued, a policy option for governments.84
The Ideological Bases of Power
Ideological power, according to Mann, derives from three related processes. 
First, humans “require concepts and categories of meaning” to structure 
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and interpret their world.  Secondly, groups of people establish norms, that 
is “shared understandings of how people should act” and, thirdly, groups 
establish aesthetic/ritual practices which both reflect the meaning and norms 
and contribute to them.85  These processes constitute political culture.   Political 
culture is central to the issue of power.  It gives “meaning, predictability, 
and form to the political process”86 But it does not just constrain or colour 
political activity.  As Milner, Errington and Siddique (among many others) 
have demonstrated, it can provide primary motivation for political activity.87 
Political culture renders political and social, and even some material, realities 
relative: 
What is ‘real’ to a Tibetan monk may not be ‘real’ to an American 
businessman.  The ‘knowledge’ of the criminal differs from the 
‘knowledge’ of the criminologist.88  
 There is a fundamental disagreement between economic structuralists 
and culturalists.  Some economic structuralists see political culture simply as 
elite ideology.  Caldwell condemned Meaning and Power  “as elite ideology, 
divorced from its economic and political base”.89  For Kautsky, exploitative 
relationships between aristocrats and peasants “can be ideologically concealed 
by some concept of reciprocity prevailing” between them, concealed by 
a ‘culture of the manor’ which created the impression that peasants were 
dependent on lords, whereas the lords were entirely dependent on the peasant’s 
work.90  Shaharuddin similarly argued that dominant cultures are, simply, the 
ideas of the ruling group.91 
 Not all economic structuralists, nor all Marxists, would agree. 
Although Wallerstein considered cultures to be “the ways in which people 
clothe their politico-economic interests and desires in order to express them, 
hide them, extend them in space and time, and preserve their memory”, he 
argued also that they “are our lives, our most inner selves but also our most 
outer selves, our personal and collective individualities”.92 Similarly, Raymond 
Williams considered culture of central importance for political analysis because 
it is the means through which humans communicate, experience, explore and 
reproduce social order.93
 The processes of internalisation of culture and its reproduction which 
Wallerstein and Williams both suggested were explicated by Berger; a three 
staged process which involves the establishment of structures and values 
which reflect and serve human needs (externalisation), the recognition of this 
reality as external to its creators (objectification) and, finally, internalisation of 
this reality.94  It is a dialectical relationship whereby theories are developed to 
legitimate already existing social institutions.  The theories are believed by the 
people affected by the institutions and, eventually, institutions are changed to 
make them accord with existing theories.95 At this point, importantly, human 
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imagination has replaced the material basis of existence as the primary political 
motivator. 
 The order of the three processes is not fixed beyond their initial 
establishment.  Economic changes, for example, could engender changes to 
the values within a society and institutions adapted accordingly.  The values 
within a society will affect economic activities and processes and help shape 
the institutions within it.96  Political cultures therefore change in response to 
changed external conditions and external conditions are variously perceived 
according to political cultures.  Changes in one will engender changes in the 
others.  Berger noted that the interdependence of objective and subjective 
(legitimising) realities provides a ‘plausibility structure’, a way of presenting 
phenomena plausibly and coherently.97 Individuals interpret their experiences, 
including their economic experiences, according to their expectations and 
values.  When these are outmoded, they will adapt or change them, or even 
adopt new expectations and values.  Wallerstein seemed to agree, arguing that: 
Tradition is always a contemporary social creation. ... we are not 
free to be totally arbitrary. There must be some surface plausibility to 
the continuities asserted.98
 Moreover, changes in culture can be achieved deliberately by 
changing its economic or institutional plausibility structure. Peasant cultures 
are unlikely to survive, indefinitely, the migration of peasants to cities and large, 
surplus incomes are essential to the maintenance of aristocratic cultures.  These 
changes might occur as the result of organic changes to plausibility structures, 
or they might be encouraged deliberately by individuals or organisations with 
power over elements of the plausibility structure.  
 Tradition, therefore, is both manufactured and contemporary,99 
constantly changing to reflect “constantly and subtly shifting relationships 
of real power”.100  The fact that tradition is ‘invented’, that it reflects power 
relationships, that it changes, does not diminish its importance.  It increases its 
complexity for study.  
Conclusion
Political cultures and economic and political structures are closely interrelated. 
They contain also the seeds of each other’s transformation as individuals seek 
to legitimise, to justify or just to explain their circumstances, and to change 
them.  Political cultures exist at all times and among all peoples.  They 
integrate material and structural sources of power and conflict into meaningful 
experiences, defining human motivation and consciousness.  Political change 
occurs when disparities between imagined and material circumstances can 
no longer be reconciled within cultural paradigms, forcing humans to change 
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either their perceptions or their circumstances.101
 Michael Mann’s identification of four types of power - political, 
economic, military and ideological provides a framework for integrating, or 
at least interrelating, the three different approaches to the analysis of southeast 
Asian politics.  But it provides a framework, also, for political science 
methodologies to inform and expand our understanding of state systems in 
pre- and early-modern southeast Asia. By extending our gaze into southeast 
Asia’s remoter past, political scientists can profoundly enrich scholarly 
understandings of it.
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